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Suffering the Children:





N o case has been so thought to symbolize the civil rights struggle of the
1950s and 1960s as does Brown v. Board of Education.' In the American
conscious Brown symbolizes more than just school desegregation. It has
been seen as morally "an idealistically "good," transcendent, and re-
deeming legal decision"' that "provided the impetus for a major change in Ameri-
can race relations."' The mere invocation of its name results in a neo-religious
conception of ideals thought to represent not only the finest in judicial morality
but the vindication of the American ethic.
Yet, as is true in so many instances of religious worship, the altar of faith de-
mands and receives a sacrifice. Like Abraham, the African-American family is
asked to place its child upon the rock of integrated schools as a demonstration of
faith in the basic tenets of Brown. How often has that faith been rewarded with
the salvation of "quality" education? How often instead has the reward been the
damnation of further failure and the subjugation of the child to new levels of
racial torment?
This Article represents just a few thoughts on the latter question. It is not a
condemnation of Brown, nor of integration. It is instead a warning that the battle
for our children's survival and future was not won in 1954, nor at any time since.
It is a statement that the forces of oppression and racism within educational sys-
tems throughout the United States have succeeded in creating within the "'inte-
grated" school a second tier of "schooling" designed to channel the Black child
away from educational opportunity and towards a life of socioeconomic subjuga-
tion-all with the blessing of supposed integration.
In addition to exploring the nature of this "new" segregation, this article will
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attempt to briefly note the traditional legal strategies available to combat race-
motivated "pushouts" and the extent to which new approaches are available.
PUSHING OUT THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN CHILD THROUGH THE
REVOLVING DOOR OF BROWN
In 1987, the Washington Post reported that:
In a county still sensitive and sore from years of fierce desegregation fights,
some Prince George's residents may be reluctant to look beneath the surface
of the disciplinary report released last week by Superintendent John A. Mur-
phy which stated that of the 17,000 suspensions last year, 77 percent went to
black students. Black students make up 61 percent of the 102,500-student
system.4
Of particular interest is the Superintendent's concern over the nature of the
"offenses" leading to suspension. Mr. Brown notes that after accounting for the
"lear" suspension cases involving obviously wrongful behavior, such as weapon
or drug possession, the overwhelming number of suspensions are for "insubordi-
nation" and "disrespect," 5 offenses long associated with racist concepts of control
and subservience.
The concern over "uppity" behavior is expressed primarily in the context of the
Black student. As expressed by one Black administrator in the same school sys-
tem: "I have a gut feeling that in our society if a white youth or adult does some-
thing it is viewed one way and that when a black does that very same thing it's
viewed differently."6
The relationship between school desegregation and school discipline in the
Washington D.C. area has been of concern throughout the 1980s. In 1983, the
NAACP, in an effort to demonstrate the failure of desegregation attempts, cited
statistics showing Black student suspensions to be twice that of white students7
Nor is the concern of the 1980s one of geographic limitation. In Seattle, Wash-
ington, in 1983, it was noted that in a school system in which African-American
children make up 25% of the student body, they accounted for 50% of the corpo-
ral punishment and 47.8% of the suspensions.8
The specter of Black children being beaten as corporal punishment evokes grim
images reminiscent of slave whippings. In Columbus, Ohio, Bill Moss, president
of the Columbus Board of Education, stated in 1988: "[I]n my mind's eye, I see
the sons and daughters of former slave owners beating the sons and daughters of
former slaves." 9
In the turbulent 35 year history of desegregation, the phenomena of race-based
4. Improving Teacher Behavior, School Discipline, Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1987, at B3, col. c.
5. Id.
6. Id. In the same article, Arthur Thomas, director for the Center for the Study of Student Citizenship,
Rights and Responsibilities, notes: "Whenever a school is desegregated, more black students than
white students are suspended. I don't understand that. Nor do I understand why for the same
offense white youngsters are suspended and black youngsters are expelled."
7. Black Student Suspensions Twice Those of Whites In Montgomery, Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1983, at B5, col.
a.
8. (United Press Int'l), June 3, 1983.
9. B. Moss, DESEGREGATION: ENOUGH is ENOUGH, p. 3 (1988). Moss reports that in the period from 1979
(the implementation of court-ordered desegregation) to 1988 (the abolition of corporal punishment
by the Columbus Board of Education), African-American students comprised from 56.6% to 61.1%
of school children receiving sanctioned beatings. During that same period of time, expulsions ranged
from 80.7% in 1979 to 60.6% in 1987. Suspensions ranged from 53.4% in 1979 to 56.9% in 1987-88.
Black children represented 32% of the school system in 1979, but 47% of the system in 1988, de-
spite desegregation.
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expulsion, suspension, and beating is not new. The Southern Regional Council
and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial, in a joint report, noted that 1970-71 data
showed within the school districts in which 90% of the nation's Black children
are enrolled, the expulsion rate was three times that of white children. The pat-
tern was noted to be particularly strong in recently desegregated schools.'0
The Civil Rights Commission, in an unpublished report covering the same
1970-71 period, noted that in 29 of 41 southern school districts surveyed, in
which Black student enrollment constituted 36.6 % of the total student popula-
tion, African-American student expulsions constituted an incredible 70.3%."
The long history of denial or exclusion of the child from the educational system
has generated a new word in the educational lexicon-"pushout."' 2 The pushout
was originally conceived to be primarily a discipline problem.' 3 This may account
in part for the significant lack of attention paid by the various civil rights enforce-
ment agencies in documenting the race-based implications. The Southern Re-
gional Council and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial note: "Despite their clear
responsibility under Title VI of the Civil Rights [Act] and non-discrimination as-
surances under various programs, neither the Office of Education nor the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has made a serious monitoring
effort."' 4
As a result, the judicial attention and remedy in this area have been limited.
When one considers the grave consequences for the pushout, the traditional lack
of due process and the absence of effective remedy are perhaps the greatest legal
injustices.
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND THE PUSHED-OUT BLACK CHILD
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court recognized that due process extended
to the classroom regarding school discipline.'" Despite the Court's sanctioning of
judicial intervention in school disciplinary matters, there was little relief for Black
children.
The case of illman v. Dade County School Board' 6 was the first to consider the issue
of race-motivated discipline. A fight between Black and white students resulted
in 93 students suspended. All but 6 of the students were Black. Despite the fact
that there was no evidence to indicate that the Black students started the hostili-
ties, the police confined the Black students to campus while releasing the white
students.
Amazingly the Court agreed with the defendants' contention that the action
against primarily Black students was justified, finding that the disproportionate
treatment was simply the result of "fortuitous circumstances."' 7
10. SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL & ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEMORIAL, THE STUDENT PusHOUT: VICTIM OF CONTIN-
UED RESISTANCE To DESEGREGATION 1 (1974) (hereinafter THE STUDENT PusHOUT).
11. Id. at 7.
12. In the broadest sense, a pushout is a student who has been prohibited from achieving his academic
potential through a deliberate denial of opportunity. Wright, The New Word is "Pushout", 4 Race Rela-
tions Rep. No. 9, at 8 (1973).
13. Id.
14. THE STUDENT PusHOTrr, supra note 10, at S.
15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Tinker involved a challenge to a
school regulation which threatened demonstrating students with suspension for wearing armbands
in protest of the Vietnam war. The Court held that both the First Amendment and due process
applied to students and that "[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our
Constitution." Id. at 551.
16. 327 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
17. Id. at 932.
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The Tillman case was followed in Florida by Rhyne v. Childs.18 Rhyne provided the
additional wrinkle which involved a student disturbance that occurred shortly af-
ter the implementation of a school desegregation plan. The resulting "melee"
brought about the cancellation of classes as well as threats against school officials.
However, neither the court nor school officials attributed the disturbance to any
particular race.
As with Tillman, the students disciplined in Rhyne were almost entirely Black.
Once again the court found no reason for intervention, finding justification for the
school's action in perhaps the most hackneyed of rationales when applied to Afri-
can-Americans-the "attitude [of the students] ... was one of non-cooperation
and non-participation."1 9
It was not until 1974, 20 years after Brown, that a court recognized that the
pattern suspension, expulsion, and beatings administered to Black children was
indeed a continuation of pre-Brown oppression. In Hawkins v. Coleman,20 African-
American children and their parents instituted a class action challenging the sub-
stance and enforcement of student disciplinary procedures in Dallas.
The record before the court detailed the grim truth about the aftermath of de-
segregation. Open segregation existed in the Texas school system until 1971.21
Following court-ordered integration,22 Black students were transferred from
schools in which they were the majority to schools in which they were a minority.
Following this "integration," there were dramatic increases in the rates of suspen-
sion, expulsion, and corporal punishment of African-American children.
During the 1972-73 school year, African-American youth comprised 38.7% of
the Dallas school district population but were the recipients of 60.5% of the sus-
pensions and from 45.8 to 54.8% of the corporal punishments. 23 Similarly, in
1973-74, Blacks were 40.9% of the student body but constituted 59.4% of stu-
dents suspended and 44.2% of those receiving corporal punishment.24
An analysis of these statistics demonstrated that the following conclusions
could be reliably drawn:
(1) Black students are being suspended from school significantly more fre-
quently than are White students.
(2) Black students are being suspended from elementary schools significantly
more frequently than are White students.
(3) Black students are being suspended from junior high schools significantly
more frequently than are White students.
(4) Black students are being suspended from senior high schools significantly
more frequently than are White students.
(5) Black students receive "more-than-3-day" suspensions significantly more
frequently than do White students.25
The conduct of the African-American student punished by Texas followed the
pattern of teachers suppressing what they perceived to be "insubordinate" behav-
ior.26 Further, an expert on institutional racism noted that white-controlled insti-
18. 359 F. Supp. 1085 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
19. 359 F. Supp. at 1089.
20. 376 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
21. Id. at 1331.
22. Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Tex. 1971), reuld in pan, aff 'd in part, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975).
Ironically the issue of racially oppressive disciplinary measures haunted the Tasby decision itself into
the 1980s. See Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1981) discussed infra.
23. 376 F. Supp. at 1333.
24. Id.
25. M. at 1335 (emphasis omitted).
26. As the court notes: "An examination of suspension and corporal punishment data for the years
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tutions such as the Dallas school system will often respond more to cultural
differences than to truly "wrongful" behavior.27
The court rejected the notion that the disparities in suspension rates could be
explained simply by concluding that Black children engage in greater levels of
misbehavior. The court instead found that racism in the administration of school
discipline was the primary factor.28
The Hawkins decision is unique in its acknowledgement of racism as a factor in
post-desegregation disciplinary treatment. In the years following Hawkins, several
attempts were made to present the issue in various jurisdictions, but in almost
every case the issue was not analyzed by the court because of settlement prior to
trial2 9 or the "sanitizing" of the issue by deciding the case without regard to its
racial component30
1972-73 and the first half of 1973-74 shows that 60% were for such offenses as truancy, class cut-
ting, talking back to the teacher, or other non-violent conduct." Id.
27. As the court notes:
For example, Dr. McDaniel, himself a Black, testified that among Blacks there is substan-
tial physical contact. To a teacher unfamiliar with the subtle nuances of this type of con-
duct, a touch or slap by one [B]lack student on another [B]lack student may be interpreted
as a hostile act when in fact it was a friendly act. Therefore, this teacher may recommend
disciplinary action when it is unjustified.
Id. at 1336. The court also noted that racism within the system also serves as a source of frustration
for Black students and may cause more "suspendable behavior" on the part of African-American
students as the system fails to respond to their needs and ambitions. Id. Both cultural ignorance on
the part of white teachers and racism-induced frustrations explain only part of the disparate treat-
ment accorded to Black students. As discussed below, unfortunately this type of analysis has re-
sulted, in later cases, in a greater tendency to blame the victim and to fail to recognize directly
applied racism.
28. Id. at 1337.
29. In Ross v. Saltmarsh, 500 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the Newburgh, New York school system was
sued because of the widespread disparate treatment of African-American and Latino students. As a
result of the action brought by the Children's Defense Fund and Mid-Hudson Legal Services, a
settlement was entered into just prior to trial. The decree entered by the court required the school
district to eliminate racially disparate treatment and specified numerous steps to be taken to achieve
that goal. Some of those steps present a blueprint for other cases as well. Included were the require-
ments that there be:
I - Modification of the district's discipline code, including clarification and reduced use of
methods which remove students from the classroom;
2 - Design of in-school alternatives to suspension;
3 - Greater involvement by students, parents, student advocates, and guidance counselors in
the discipline process;
4 - Assistance to teachers with high discipline referral rates;
5 - Tutoring for students with achievement-related behavior problems;
6 - Referral of students for psychological services
7 - More interracial participation in extra-curricular activities;
8 - Exploration of new ways to group students academically so that their classrooms have a
good balance of minority and white students.
Successful Challenge to Discriminatory Discipline Practices in Upstate New York, reprinted in P.WEccsrEiN, SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE AND STUDENT RIGHTS 108 (1982).
30. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), is a primary example of how the issue of race-based disciplinary
measures became lost in the more general question of the rights of students regardless of race. Goss
involved a claim by several Black high school students, alleging that the Columbus, Ohio school
system imposed temporary suspensions without proper notice or prior hearing. The Court held that
due process required notice and hearing where short-term suspensions were imposed. The Chil-
dren's Defense Fund, appearing as amicus, urged the Court to consider the data gathered by the
Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, showing that Black and
Latino children were suspended disproportionately. BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND
oF THE WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, INC. AND THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE at p. 20-23.
The Court, however, takes little note of the racial implications but instead bases its ruling on due
process principles applicable to all children facing discipline. In essence, the Court ignores the ques-
tion of why the child is facing the disciplinary process at all.
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The refusal of courts to consider the racial implications of disciplinary proceed-
ings after Hawkins, particularly in desegregated schools, has created and main-
tained an atmosphere in which the Black child is considered simply a child whose
trouble with the school system is largely his or her own fault. Thus, as with any
criminal defendant, we are all too willing to assume that the punishment system
has been justly invoked. Cases like Goss suggest that the emphasis should be
placed on the reliability of the system to determine guilt, through due process,
rather than on whether the child should be exposed to the disciplinary system at
all.
This issue is of no small significance. The damage caused by merely accusing
the African-American child is substantial. The child becomes a pariah in his or
her own school and among the teachers. Subjective assessments of the student
that reflect themselves in grades and recommendations are unduly influenced by
allegations that the Black child is an unruly troublemaker.3' Nor is procedural
due process a real protection if the child in fact has engaged in the conduct. It
ignores the question of whether the Black would not be prosecuted if white.
The decision in Goss has caused the issue to be lost in the false protection of due
process. Ironically this is best seen in the aftermath of the Hawkins case itself. In
Tasby v. Estes32, the plaintiffs who brought the original desegregation claim against
the Dallas school system were denied relief when they sought to challenge the
system's failure to eliminate race-based school discipline as previously ordered.
The court, in denying them relief, found no cause for parental complaints where
the children were afforded "due process" under Goss.
That our legal system has failed to provide Black children with adequate pro-
tection from post-Brown oppression in the area of school-imposed sarctions ap-
pears to be certain. It is therefore necessary that the system stop congratulating
itself for the false victory of Brown and look instead to developing new methods
for combatting the egregious daily victimization of Black youth.
SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW APPROACH TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
In 1967 the United States Supreme Court recognized that juvenile offenders
were subjected to punishment that was the functional equivalent of the adult pe-
nal system. 3 It is perhaps time that we view punishment within our schools with
the same degree of realism. If race-motivated prosecutions in our criminal system
are impermissible, then so too should race-motivated school punishment be
banned. In order to do that, it will be necessary that the judicial system allow the
issue of racism in disciplinary matters to be raised directly. It will be necessary for
the courts, like the court in Hawkins, to directly and clearly address the issue by
decision.
Some guidance might be had from the United States Supreme Court's answer to
the question of wrongfully motivated criminal prosecutions. In Wayte v. United
Staes,34 the Court moved away from its long-standing reluctance to recognize a
claim of selective prosecution. In Wayte, the petitioner sought relief from a con-
viction for knowingly failing to register for the draft. The defendant asserted that
this prosecution was the result of his anti-draft registration activity and that less
vocal protestors were not prosecuted.
31. Notice the joy of many Americans, from President Reagan on down, when New Jersey principal Joe
Clark made headlines for "getting tough" with minority youth, by imposing summary suspensions
and threatening corporal punishment to the tune of a baseball bat. See Begley, A Bare-Knuckled Princi.
pal Gets A Big Fight, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 1988, at 80.
32. 643 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1981).
33. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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Although the Court did not grant the petitioner relief, it did hold that a selec-
tive criminal prosecution may be successfully challenged if the defendant can
prove that: 1) others similarly situated have not been prosecuted for the same
conduct and 2) the discriminatory selective prosecution was based on an imper-
missible ground. Among the grounds mentioned as impermissible is race. The
Court, however, did go on to state that the defendant had the burden of proving a
specific intent to discriminate on the impermissible ground.
While the disciplinary process in a public school is not a criminal trial, it is one
in which the possible sanctions justifies a significant level of due process protec-
tion. In Goss the Court held that even a short suspension entitled the student to
notice and if the student denied the charge, an opportunity to present his or her
side of the story. 5 What needs to be recognized is that the motivation for the
suspension is as important, if not more important, than whether or not the stu-
dent denies engaging in the conduct.
Like the defendant in Wayte, a Black child accused of being "insubordinate"
should be able to trigger a quasi-judicial inquiry into why he or she is being sub-
jected to a disciplinary proceeding, as a matter of due process. Once raised, the
burden should be placed on the school to justify selection of the Black child for
prosecution. 6
While this type of approach may have some ameliorative effect, it does not go
to the heart and source of the problem. The African-American child is subjected
to disparate discipline in the desegregated setting because those making the deci-
sion to prosecute are largely of a different cultural background. Desegregation
under Brown moved students but, for the most part, not teachers or administrators.
The plight of the Black child will not significantly improve until the decision-
makers either share the same cultural base as the child or are influenced by the
same base. Simply put African-Americans must be represented significantly
among the teachers and principals who must make the decision to prosecute.
The plaintiffs in Tasby saw this dearly when they asked in 1981 that Black.par-
ents be included in the process of formulating and implementing disciplinary pro-
cedure in Dallas.3 7 That the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize the appropriateness
of the request is symptomatic of the failure of the judicial system.
The failure of the proponents of desegregation in general to insist on the inclu-
sion and promotion of Black teachers and administrators as a sine quo non of court-
ordered desegregation is the heart and source of the current problem.
CONCLUSION
This short analysis of a forgotten consequence of desegregation in no way pre-
tends to be complete. Nor does it provide a blueprint for change. It is instead
intended primarily to be a reminder that the battle for survival of the African-
American is far from over. It is also a reminder that short-sighted remedies can
pose dangers as great as the conditions that are sought to be corrected. As we
35. 419 U.S. at 581.
36. This would differ significantly from the equal protection analysis used by the defendant in Wayle.
Under Wayle the defendant had the near impossible burden of proving intent. That type of burden
is consistent with modem equal protection analysis. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Authority, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Intent need not be a requirement of due process because due process
is a flexible concept and when applied to a school setting can be adapted to meet the realities of the
given situation. See In Re Gault, supra note 33 (holding that the reality of delinquency adjudication
required the adoption of a criminal procedure-like flat right to counsel and the recognition of Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination).
37. Tasby, supra note 32.
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memorialize 35 years of Brown, should we not stop to ask whether the Black child
stand another 35 years of Brown's consequences?
